of service and other factors support partitioning the Internet into Intranets and virtual private networks. Similarly content providers can use caching 8 and premium traffic routing and management service to secure more reliable service than that available from best efforts routing.
Clearly service diversification can require many reasonable and lawful types of discrimination between Internet users notwithstanding a heritage in the first two generations of nondiscrimination and "best efforts" routing of traffic. Most Internet Service Providers ("ISPs")
offer access on an unmetered, monthly subscription basis, but some ISPs already offer different levels of bit delivery speeds. Likewise ISPs increasingly have the ability to examine individual traffic streams 9 and prioritize them creating a dichotomy between plain vanilla, best efforts routing and more expensive, superior traffic management services.
However the potential exists for carriers operating the major networks used to switch and route bitstreams to go beyond satisfying diverse consumer requirements. Advocates for the experience noticeable delay whenever there is a burst of high-priority traffic. The technical term for this kind of on-again, off-again delay is 'jitter.'" Edward W. Caching refers to intermediate and temporary storage of data. "Google makes and analyzes a copy of each Web page that it finds, and stores the HTML code from those pages in a temporary repository called a cache. " Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F.Supp.2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006 (holding that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) provides a "safe harbor" exemption from liability for making cached copies of copyrighted works).
9
"A packet sniffer (also known as a network analyzer or protocol analyzer or, for particular types of networks, an Ethernet sniffer or wireless sniffer) is computer software or computer hardware that can intercept and log traffic passing over a digital network or part of a network. As data streams travel back and forth over the network, the sniffer captures each packet and eventually decodes and analyzes its content according to the appropriate RFC or other specifications." Wikipedia, Packet sniffer; available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_sniffer. principle of network neutrality 10 claim the potential exists for ISPs to engineer a fragmented and "balkanized" next generation Internet to achieve anticompetitive goals. 11 The worst case scenario envisioned by network neutrality advocates sees a reduction in innovation, efficiency, consumer benefits and national productivity occasioned by a divided Internet: one medium prone to congestion and declining reliability and one offering superior performance and potential competitive advantages to users able and willing to pay, or affiliated with the ISP operating the 10 For links to a representative sample of advocacy papers and analyses of network neutrality see National Regulatory Research Institute, Diverse papers on net neutrality; available at: http://www.nrri.ohio-state.edu/Telecom/hot-topics-links/net-neutrality/papers/. bitstream transmission network. 12 Opponents of network neutrality mandates scoff at the possibility of the worst case scenario, and view government intervention as anathema.
13
This paper will examine the network neutrality debate with an eye toward refuting and dismissing the many false and misleading claims and concentrating on the real problems occasioned by the Internet's third evolution. The paper accepts as necessary and proper many types of price and quality of service discrimination. However the paper identifies other types of hidden and harmful discrimination. The paper concludes with an identification of best practices in "good" discrimination that should satisfy most network neutrality goals without creating disincentives that might dissuade ISPs from building the infrastructure needed for Internet 3.0 services.
I. The Provocation: Broadband Access and Upstream Carriers Have to Upgrade Their Networks Without Certain Profit
Incumbent telephone companies, such as Verizon and AT&T, own and operate ISPs having the largest market share and operating several of the major long haul networks. 14 Internet access and long haul data services have become increasingly significant revenue generators in light of the substantial decline in long distance voice telephony rates and lost market share for local exchange telephone service. 15 The availability of VoIP services offering flat-rated long distance on a monthly subscription rate, or per call rates for a few pennies a minute, show how software applications riding on top of a basic transmission link can devastate an existing business plan that anticipates the continuation of large profit margins for plain old telephone services.
VoIP and wireless services have adversely impact wireline local exchange revenues as consumers migrate to a triple play bundle of services from cable television companies offering local and long distance telephone service and Internet access coupled with their core video programming services. 16 To retain subscribers the incumbent telephone companies have created 14 Mark Winther, Tier-1 ISPs: What They Are and Why They Are Important, IDC White Paper (May, 2006) ; available at: http://www.ntt.net/english/library/pdf/IDCTier1-Whitepaper.pdf.
15
See International Telecommunication Union, The Future of Voice: Consumer Issues, Briefing Paper (Jan. 2007); available at: http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/voice/papers/FoV-EwanSutherland-Final.pdf; see also, International Telecommunication Union, The Future of Voice Workshop web site; available at: http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/voice/meeting.phtml. 16 "Few doubt that the future of telecommunications will rely mostly on broadband and wireless technologies. Wireless and broadband technologies are transforming the telecommunications market, offering users ubiquitous access to voice, data, and internet services. The number of mobile subscribers has already surpassed that of end-user switched access lines served by local exchange carriers." National Regulatory Research Institute, Methods for Analyzing the Effects of Broadband and Wireless Services on Competition in Local Telephony, Project Announcement; available at: http://www.nrri.ohio-state.edu/current-their own triple play bundles at prices that generate lower margins for the voice telephony portion of the package deal.
Faced with declining margins, revenues and profits from previously core services, incumbent telephone companies have belatedly embraced digital technologies and broadband services that include Internet access and Internet Protocol Television ("IPTV"), a facilities-based competitive alternative to cable television. 17 The incumbents previously refrained from aggressively investing in these services for a number of reasons including the view that existing, "legacy" regulations, which mandated access by competitors to their facilities at below market rates, 18 created severe disincentives, the necessary technologies and market demand had not projects/telecommunications/methods-for-analyzing-the-impact-of-broadband-and-wirelessservices-on/.
17 "Rather than 'broadcasting' a constant stream of all available programs, as cable does and Verizon plans to do, IPTV stores a potentially unlimited number of programs on a central server, which users then call up on demand. SBC will not replace the copper lines that currently run into customer premises. Instead, to make sure there is sufficient bandwidth between the neighborhood node where the optical fiber terminates and the household premise, it will upgrade the DSL equipment currently at those nodes and in households with VDSL technology. At the household, the viewer will use the IP technology to send a signal to the SBC end-office to send a particular channel or video on demand selection. That signal will be sent over the same bandwidth used for data and VoIP service. In SBC's system, a single customer line will have enough bandwidth to support up to four active television sets per household at a time, or up to two HDTV channels at a time." Charles B. Goldfarb, Telecommunications Act: Competition, Innovation, and Reform, Congressional Research Service 37 (Jan. 13, 2006) (Fall, 2006) .
18
"For almost ten years, the FCC has struggled with crafting regulations that promote local exchange carrier competition by requiring incumbent carriers to lease portions of their networks to competitors.
18 Such network element unbundling offers market entrants the opportunity to provide service and generate competition well before they would have completed construction of their own facilities. 18 Incumbents have successfully argued that instead of jumpstarting competition, the FCC's policies made it possible for market entrants to thrive without having to risk substantial investment in physical plant. The Commission's rules permit market entrants to resell existing facilities and services of incumbent carriers on favorable terms and conditions." matured, a post dotcom meltdown reluctance to assume greater risk 19 and perhaps the failure to forecast the speed at which core wireline service revenues would decline. [P]etitioners argued before the Commission that mandatory unbundling at Commissionmandated prices reduces the incentives for innovation and investment in facilities. Their reasoning, of course, is that a regulated price below true cost will reduce or eliminate the incentive for an ILEC to invest in innovation (because it will have to share the rewards with CLECs), and also for a CLEC to innovate (because it can get the element cheaper as a UNE). Indeed, many prices that seem to equate to cost have this effect. Some innovations pan out, others do not. If parties who have not shared the risks are able to come in as equal partners on the successes, and avoid payment for the losers, the incentive to invest plainly declines." U.S. Telecom Assn v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2002) Telecommunications is defined as "the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received." 47 U.S.C. § 153(43). Telecommunications service means "the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used." 47 U.S.C. § 153(46). The Communications Act defines telecommunications carrier as "any provider of telecommunications services, except that such term does not include aggregators of telecommunications services (as defined in section 226). A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this Act only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services, except that the Commission shall determine whether the provision of fixed and mobile satellite service shall be treated as common carriage." 47 U.S.C. § 153(44).
While information service providers use telecommunications to transmit bitstreams, the FCC has chosen not to separate this functionality from the information processing that also occurs. In other words the FCC considers telecommunications to be subordinate to and fully integrated with the predominant information service.
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Unlike telecommunications financial settlements, which typically meter and price each and every network use, ISPs agree not to meter and price traffic they agree to carry based on the expectation that their "peer" ISP will carry an equivalent volume of traffic. Even for instances where one ISP pays another for carriage, the "transiting" agreement executed between the two ISPs specifies the bandwidth and bitstream carriage capabilities offered without typically metering each session of network usage. For more background on ISP peering and transiting see Rob Frieden, Network in an expectation among carriers that they will cooperate on interconnection arrangements.
When carriers first established interconnection agreements they refrained from exact route mapping and traffic metering. The Transmission Control Protocol used by ISPs determines routing "on the fly" based on current conditions as opposed to fixed routing used by telephone companies. 36 The ISPs initially refrained from metering traffic based on the initial expectation that traffic volumes were roughly equivalent and the cost of metering was not worth the bother in light of the fact that third parties, such as government agencies, subsidized operations.
Even now the largest Tier-1 ISPs agree to make their networks and global network access available on a zero cost, sender keep all "peering" 37 basis for other Tier-1 ISPs. 38 Smaller ISPs
35
"The idea of a computer network intended to allow general communication between users of various computers has developed through a large number of stages. The melting pot of developments brought together the network of networks that we know as the Internet." Wikipedia, History of the Internet; available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Internet.
36
"TCP/IP routes packets anonymously on a 'first come, first served' and 'best efforts' basis. Thus, it is poorly suited to applications that are less tolerant of variations in throughput rates, such as streaming media and VoIP, and is biased against network-based security features that protect e-commerce and ward off viruses and spam." Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (Fall, 2005) .
37
Internet peering refers to a reciprocal traffic routing arrangement whereby one ISP agrees to accept traffic for onward routing in exchange for a similar routing commitment by another ISP. Peering typically involves no settlement or payment of funds as ISPs agree to peer only if they generate and receive roughly the same volume of traffic. See also, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peering.
38
"Tier 1 networks typically seek to protect their relatively rare status by preventing new networks from becoming Tier 1's and thus potentially competing. The networks often accomplish this by setting "peering requirements" which are intended to be too high for new networks to meet. Some experts in the field of Internet interconnections have compared the collective behaviors and motivations of Tier 1 networks to those of a cartel, in that they attempt to reduce competition in Internet bandwidth pricing through tacit collusion, and attempt to restrict the now must pay for "transiting" 39 access to larger ISPs' networks and the access these ISPs have secured to other ISPs' networks . In addition to transiting payments from smaller ISPs, Tier-1
ISPs, affiliated with incumbent telephone companies, also receive payment from end users that they serve directly, e.g., through Digital Subscriber Line monthly subscriptions and new fiber optic residential and business Internet access services.
However, the combined revenues from these two sources have not satisfied top management officers, for two reasons: 1) proliferating ICE services, such as search engines, online gaming and real time delivery of video generate ongoing need to upgrade broadband services, often without a commensurate ability to raise rates; and 2) sources of content upstream from an incumbent telephone company's ISP network get to satisfy end user demand and have content delivered downstream to the end user without having to pay the intermediary ISPs that have participated in the routing and bitstream delivery of the traffic as part of their transiting and peering agreements with other ISPs. In the first instance the incumbent companies have found that Internet access services may have become a commodity business, or at the very least offer lower margins that anticipated. In the second instance the incumbent companies have identified admission of new members. When one Tier 1 is perceived to be "cheating" the cartel by selling transit for too low a price, or by "dumping" too much outbound heavy bandwidth (which is significantly easier to deliver for the sending network than the receiving network), other members may move to de-peer that network." Wikipedia, Tier1 network, Politics; available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier_1_carrier.
39
Internet transiting refers to a traffic routing arrangement whereby one ISP agrees to accept traffic for onward routing for compensation. Transiting involves a settlement and payment of funds because one ISP requires access to the links, subscribers and content available via another ISP's network and its peering arrangements. "Transit is the business relationship whereby one ISP provides (usually sells) access to all destinations in its routing table." William B. Norton, Internet Service Providers and Peering, Draft 2.5 (undated) available at: http://www.equinix.com/pdf/whitepapers/PeeringWP.2.pdf.
another potential source of access payments that heretofore have avoided having to make direct payments to some of the carriers participating in the link from content source to recipient.
The apparent inability of ISPs to demand and receive payment from each ISP or ISP customer has frustrated senior management and motivated them to utter provocative claims that heavy users of their networks, such as Google, have become free riders:
Now what they would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain't going to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it. So there's going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay for the portion they're using. Why should they be allowed to use my pipes? The Internet can't be free in that sense, because we and the cable companies have made an investment and for a Google or Yahoo! or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes [for] "Two-sided (or more generally multi-sided1) markets are roughly defined as markets in which one or several platforms enable interactions between end-users, and try to get the two (or multiple) sides "on board" by appropriately charging each side. That is, platforms court each side while attempting to make, or at least not lose, money overall." Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: An Overview (March 12, 2004 ); available at: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/rochet_tirole.pdf.
47
The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make up the Internet and provider users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the content available via these networks.
"use" AT&T networks without making direct payments to AT&T. Nothing about network neutrality forecloses AT&T from erecting a service so attractive to Google and other heavy users of the Internet as to entice them to opt for premium carriage of their traffic in lieu of the shared routes made available through the peering and transit arrangements secured by the ISPs directly serving these heavy users. For example, Akamai and other network management firms offer clients enhanced Internet traffic routing and content delivery by offloading traffic from best efforts routing options and onto better than best efforts options. Traffic can reach consumers with greater likelihood of on time delivery and reliability when ISPs and other Internet companies directly manage particular traffic streams with an eye toward reducing the number of routers the traffic has to traverse, avoiding circuitous routing and inserting traffic on the most reliable and least congested networks.
Many universities, along with corporations, government research agencies, and not-forprofit networking organizations, have agreed to achieve this type of outcome by underwriting superior routing through the Internet-2 network, 48 AT&T has agreed to make available to other peers and transit customers, including the ISPs directly serving heavy content providers such as Google.
2) Reimposition of Common Carrier Responsibilities
The incumbent carriers make a valid point that elements of network neutrality impose common carrier regulatory burdens on ISPs that have avoided such burdens, or have been able to secure a reclassification of services to avoid such responsibilities. Having avoided this classification the incumbent carriers imply that common carrier regulation imposes costly burdens that limit flexibility, stifle innovation and subverts the opportunity for self-regulation via unfettered marketplace forces. Opponents to network neutrality also consider enforcement of the antitrust law a sufficient safeguard that could punish abuses after the fact without the cost and burdens of ex ante regulation. 325, 338-40, 534-35, 543, 548; 47 While reviewing courts have questioned the nature, type and rates of the FCC mandated common carrier interconnection and facilities-leasing requirements, the judiciary has not deemed the requirements confiscatory: "There is no evidence that the decision to adopt TELRIC [i.e., compulsory pricing of local exchange service elements on the basis of quite low Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost] was arbitrary, opportunistic, or undertaken with a confiscatory purpose. Indeed, the indications in the record are very much to the contrary." Verizon Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 535 U.S. 467, 472, 122 S.Ct. 1646 467, 472, 122 S.Ct. , 1652 467, 472, 122 S.Ct. (2002 . F.C.C. v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 107 S.Ct. 1107 (1987) (rate set by the FCC was not confiscatory and thus did not amount to an unconstitutional taking).
However next generation networks will offer a integrated blend of ICE services, including the functional equivalent of traditionally regulated, legacy voice telephony and cable television.
The incumbent carriers appear ready to make two key arguments that equate regulation going forward as confiscatory: 1) robust facilities-based competition obviates the need for regulation, including common carrier aspects of network neutrality; and 2) commingling and integrating services that use telecommunications for bitstream transmission converts all retail offerings into information services. The incumbents have convinced many legislators and regulators that network neutrality requirements do not make sense in a competitive environment where the Internet serves as single medium for convergent ICE services.
a)
The "Of the 64.6 million total high-speed lines, 44.1% were cable modem, 34.9% were ADSL, 1.5% were symmetric DSL (SDSL) or traditional wireline, 1.1% were fiber to the end user premises, and 18.4% used other technologies." FCC High Speed Internet Access Statistics at 2. "Of the 50.4 million lines which were faster than 200 kbps in both directions, 55.9% were cable modem, 36.3% were ADSL, 1.9% were SDSL or traditional wireline, 1.4% were fiber to the end user premises, and 4.5% used other technologies." Id. at 3. Of the 45.9 million lines serving residential subscribers, "cable modem represented 59.9% while 35.8% were ADSL, 0.2% were SDSL or traditional wireline, 1.0% were fiber to the end user premises, and 3.2% used other technologies." Id. at 3.
66
" [W] e find that resolving the narrow classification issues of BPL-enabled Internet access service immediately will promote the deployment of BPL technology and the proliferation of this nascent service. Perhaps more importantly, we find that saddling this service with conditions that do not apply to other competing forms of broadband Internet access services would create a regulatory disparity antithetical to our creation of a level playing field for all modes of this service. b)
The Information Service Classification "Safe Harbor" While the FCC also exempts bitstream transmitting carriers from regulation, in light of the information service classification, the Commission could opt to examine separately the different layers combined to support the delivery of a service, such as VoIP. For background on a revised regulatory regime that applies different degrees of government oversight based on the scope of competition in each layer of service that blends telecommunications packet delivery with intelligent networking , software applications and content see Richard S. Whitt, Afor just about any ICE service carried via DSL and cable modem links, regardless of its functional equivalency with legacy, regulated services.
The FCC already has begun to realize the quandary it has created for itself by fashioning such an elastic and expanding safe harbor. Now bereft of Title II jurisdiction, the Commission has resorted to Title I of the Communications Act, as amended, to retain an "ancillary" regulatory hook if and when necessary. The Commission already has applied this exception to the information service regulatory safe harbor by requiring VoIP service providers to contribute to universal telephone service funding, to make available emergency 911 access available and to cooperate with law enforcement officials. The Commission has rationalized its imposition of quasi-common carrier, telecommunications service regulation by invoking broad notions of the public interest, by making a distinction between how different laws define telecommunications 70 and by making a questionable differentiation between the use of telecommunications to transport bits corresponding to an information service and the use of telecommunications to transport bits corresponding to retail telecommunications services. PL 103-414, 108 Stat 4279 (October 25, 1994) , codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(B)(ii) defines a "telecommunications carrier" as "a person or entity engaged in providing wire or electronic communication switching or transmission service to the extent that the Commission finds that such service is a replacement for a substantial portion of the local telephone exchange service and that it is in the public interest to deem such a person or entity to be a telecommunications carrier for purposes of this title." The FCC has interpreted this section as requiring the Commission "to deem certain service providers to be telecommunications carriers for CALEA purposes even when those providers are not telecommunications carriers under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended." Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services, ET Docket No. 04-295, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14989, 14993 (2005) . For example, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as amended, specified the right of wireless telecommunications service providers to secure rights of way and tower siting access to federally owned property. Telecommunications Act of 1996, P.L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) , Sec. 734(c) (2006) , codified at 47 U.S.C. §332(c)(7). Generally a telecommunications service provider can secure nondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way owned or controlled by another telecommunications service provider. 47 U.S.C. §224.
confiscates their property. It comes across as disingenuous for both telephone and cable television companies to rationalize the right to extend legacy privileges, acquired during their regulated years, to convergent ICE services, many or all of which appear to qualify for the information service safe harbor.
Currently cable television operators and telephone companies can leverage preexisting rights or way or secure new rights of way based on their former, or existing, but possibly now temporary, regulated status. There appears to be no distinction in terms of the scope of rights of way access available to carriers operating in their legacy, regulated mode and the very same carriers providing a larger array of services, some or all of which falling outside legacy regulators' jurisdiction. 74 For example, cable television operators regularly install equipment, including large above ground pedestals, without any payment to the property owner, so that the operators can offer triple play services regardless of whether the land owner wants these new services and without regard to the limited scope of services the carrier first offered as the basis for securing the rights of way initially. Similarly telephone companies continue to install new or replacement lines on private property without having to pay land owners, based on preexisting rights of way granted to the companies in their capacity telecommunications service providers.
For so long as incumbent carriers continue to exploit the privileges conferred upon them in their capacity as regulated operators, these carriers should continue to accept limited quasicommon carrier responsibilities. For example, the broadcast television channel "must carry"
obligations of cable television operators do not evaporate simply because telephone companies 74 The Supreme Court has endorsed this leveraging of access rights. In National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Inc., v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 122 S. Ct. 782 (2002) the Supreme ruled that cable television companies have the same legal right to access and attach wires to poles owned and operated by other utilities regardless of which such pole attachments are used to provide regulated video or unregulated broadband services. may offer competing video program delivery services, or that cable television operators now can use existing copper, a blend of copper and fiber optics cables, or a completely fiber optic medium to provide both cable television video programming, IPTV, telephony, Internet access and other telecommunications or information services. Likewise, the responsibilities applied to incumbent telephone companies operating the only telecommunication wire into homes did not evaporate simply because a second wire became available, or the fact that the telephone company now can use existing or new media to provide telecommunications and information services.
II.
The See, e.g., SavetheInternet.com, How does this threat to Internet freedom affect you? available at: http://www.savetheinternet.com/=threat (claiming blocked access by Canadian incumbent telephone company to a Web site sympathetic to the Telecommunications Workers Union during a contentious labor dispute; intentional degradation of competing VoIP service by Shaw, a major Canadian cable, internet, and telephone service company and blocked emails that mentioned www.dearaol.com --an advocacy campaign opposing an attempt by AOLTime Warner's to secure payment from e-mail senders). The charges imposed by local exchange carriers for use of their networks to originate and terminate traffic depend on the nature of the service regardless of whether different services impose different costs. For example, local exchange carriers typically charge more to terminate a wireless, cellular telephone call than a conventional, wireline telephone call even though the costs of doing so are identical. Traffic characterized as voice telephony also triggers carrier liability for contributing to universal service funding. Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act created an express mandate for the FCC and state public utility commissions to "encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans." 47 U.S.C. §157(a). The Act defines advanced telecommunications capability "without regard to any transmission media or technology, as high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology." 47 U.S.C. §157(c)(1).
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The FCC acknowledges that different types of carriers pay different rates to originate and terminate traffic over identical local exchange telephone company facilities. "Existing intercarrier compensation rules may be categorized as follows: access charge rules, which govern the payments that interexchange carriers ("IXCs") and CMRS carriers make to LECs to originate and terminate long-distance calls. . . . The access charge rules can be further broken down into interstate access charge rules that are set by this Commission, and intrastate access charge rules that are set by state public utility commissions. Both the interstate and intrastate access charge rules establish charges that IXCs must pay to LECs when the LEC originates or terminates a call for an IXC, or transports a call to, or from, the IXC's point of presence ("POP"). CMRS carriers also pay access charges to LECs for CMRS-to-LEC traffic that is not considered applicable only to unaffiliated VoIP service providers exemplifies a classic price squeeze where a competitor of the ISP incurs a higher charge for an essential service element than the ISP charges to affiliates and favored VoIP service providers.
B.
Unjustified Apprehension
Network neutrality advocates fear that the next generation Internet will contain so much bias and preferential treatment as to jeopardize the fundamental end-to-end connectivity that has contributed to success. This "curtains for the Internet" perspective overstates the potential harm from network tiering, even unlawful, anticompetitive practices, for several reasons. 
III. The Resolution
Legislation would solve the network neutrality debate by providing principles for which the FCC would have express legal authority to enforce. In light of the controversy surrounding this issue, the lack of consensus and well funded policy expressions, Congress may not remedy the problem in a timely manner. 83 Absent legislation the stakeholders will have to take affirmative steps on their own toward resolution.
82
"What the ISPs don't tell the public is that there are no free-riders among the content companies. They pay handsomely for their bandwidth. In fact, they are the true bread and butter for the major telecoms and ISPs. The reason that this "Network Neutrality" controversy exists today is that ISPs don't want to admit that their whole business model is flawed. They don't want to admit to their home customers that they need to pay for metered bandwidth just like they pay for metered water and electricity. provided a document that, reluctantly perhaps, acknowledges that network neutrality is a concept that parties can convert into actual practices and service commitments.
The AT&T network neutrality commitments contain a time limited agreement to comply with a previous FCC statement of principles that articulate a baseline code of conduct for ISPs.
In a non-binding, non-compulsory Policy Statement the FCC articulated four "principles":
(1) consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice;
(2) consumers are entitled to run applications and services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement; (3) consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network; and (4) consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers. Trade Commission and other agencies, and it would not prevent better than best efforts service arrangements. Such arrangements could include variable bandwidth and throughput services to end users, peers and transiting customers, bandwidth partitioning and service metering.
Additionally any ISP that serves both end users, whether by resale or facilities it owns and operates, should commit to a "best practices" collection of service commitments including the following:
an affirmative obligation not to drop packets and create congestion when actual traffic conditions do not necessitate such action; no retaliation through targeted degradation in service quality for any network user that has refused to pay for premium services; no port blocking and other refusals to deliver traffic onward to another ISP or the intended recipient except when such action would violate laws or cause harm to the ISP's or other ISPs' networks; a commitment to make available any better than best efforts to any similarly situated customer;
an agreement not to override firewalls, filters and other traffic management technologies or services made available to customers or installed by customers, except when such action would violate laws or cause harm to the ISP's or other ISPs' networks; and no intentional failures to comply with existing Service Level Agreements executed with end users, peers and transiting customers.
IV. Conclusion
The network neutrality debate highlights a particularly contentious time in ICE policy making. Stakeholders appear to have little inclination to find a middle ground, and decision makers appear to have even less. Policy making has become predominated by sponsored research, politics, campaign contrubutions and rhetoric. In light of an apparent disinterest for the facts it comes as no surprise that the network neutrality debate highlights opposing perceptions about the impact from changes in the next generation Internet. Regretably no unbiased fact finding appears readily available, because politicization at the FCC prevents fair minded assessment by the Democratic and Republican Commissioners and heretofore the conflict has not generated a question of law or fact reviewable by a court.
Network neutrality opponents have overstated the case that competition would remedy any and all instances of illegal network bias. A fully self-regulating Internet marketplace does not exist, nor can one confidently assert that the Internet marketplace would remedy all attempts at unreasonable network bias. On the other hand the Internet has not failed to function when network operators and content providers cut exclusive and preferential deals, or when network providers offer better than best efforts routing.
For better or worst Internet 3.0 will adopt many of the biased networking characteristics of current vintage cable television and third generation cellular telephony. Cable television operators enjoy substantial freedom to cut special content delivery deals, but lawful "must carry" The FCC should agree to examine allegations of network bias and evaluate the complaint from a public interest template that considers whether discrimination constitutes an unfair trade practice, or a reasonable attempt at diversifying and proliferating information services.
